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Abstract
In recent years, gradient boosted decision tree learning has proven
to be an effective method of training robust models. Moreover,
collaborative learning among multiple parties has the potential
to greatly benefit all parties involved, but organizations have also
encountered obstacles in sharing sensitive data due to business,
regulatory, and liability concerns.
We propose Secure XGBoost, a privacy-preserving system that
enables multiparty training and inference of XGBoost models. Se-
cure XGBoost protects the privacy of each party’s data as well as
the integrity of the computation with the help of hardware enclaves.
Crucially, Secure XGBoost augments the security of the enclaves us-
ing novel data-oblivious algorithms that prevent access side-channel
attacks on enclaves induced via access pattern leakage.
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• Security and privacy→ Distributed systems security; Side-
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1 Introduction
Secure XGBoost is a platform for secure collaborative gradient-
boosted decision tree learning, based on the popular XGBoost li-
brary. In a nutshell, multiple clients (or data owners) can collabo-
ratively use Secure XGBoost to train an XGBoost model on their
collective data in a cloud environment while preserving the privacy
of their individual data. Even though training is done on the cloud,
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Secure XGBoost ensures that the data of individual clients is re-
vealed to neither the cloud environment nor other clients. Clients
collaboratively orchestrate the training pipeline remotely, and Se-
cure XGBoost guarantees that each client retains control of the
computation that runs on its individual data.
At its core, Secure XGBoost leverages the protection offered by
secure hardware enclaves to preserve the privacy of the data and the
integrity of the computation even in the presence of a hostile cloud
environment. On top of enclaves, Secure XGBoost adds a second
layer of security that additionally protects the enclaves against
a large class of side-channel attacks—namely, attacks induced by
access pattern leakage (see §2.2). Even though the attacker cannot
directly observe the data protected by the enclave, it can still infer
sensitive information about the data by monitoring the enclave’s
memory access patterns during execution. To prevent such leakage,
we redesign the training and inference algorithms in XGBoost to
be data-oblivious, guaranteeing that the memory access patterns of
enclave code does not reveal any information about sensitive data.
In implementing Secure XGBoost, we strived to preserve the
XGBoost API as much as possible so that our system remains easy
to use for data scientists. Our implementation has been adopted by
multiple industry partners, and is available at https://github.com/
mc2-project/secure-xgboost.
2 Background
2.1 Hardware enclaves
Secure enclaves are a recent advance in computer processor technol-
ogy that enable the creation of a secure region of memory (called an
enclave) on an otherwise untrusted machine. Any data or software
placed in the enclave is isolated from the rest of the system, and no
other process on the same processor (not even privileged software
like the OS or hypervisor) can access or tamper with that memory.
Examples of secure enclave technology include Intel SGX [21] and
AMD Memory Encryption [16].
An important feature of hardware enclaves is remote attesta-
tion [1], which allows a remote client system to cryptographically
verify that specific software has been securely loaded into an en-
clave. As part of attestation, the enclave can also bootstrap a secure
channel with the client by generating a public key and returning it
with the signed report.
2.2 Side-channel leakage
A large class of known side-channel attacks on enclaves exploit
data-dependent access patterns—i.e., the sequence of accesses made
by the executing program to disk, network, or memory. The attacker
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void max(int x, int y,
int* z) {
if (x > y)
*z = x;
else
*z = y;
}
Figure 1: Regular code
void max(int x, int y,
int* z) {
bool cond = ogreater(x, y);
oassign(cond , x, y, z);
}
Figure 2: Oblivious code
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Figure 3: Parties invoke an orchestrator service at the cloud,
which waits for calls from all parties before relaying the
commands to the enclave cluster. Enclave inputs and out-
puts are always encrypted, and are decrypted only within
the enclave or at client premises.
can observe the access sequence in a variety of ways: e.g., cache-
timing attacks [4, 9, 10, 13, 22, 30], branch prediction attacks [18],
page monitoring [6, 32], or snooping on the memory bus [17].
Example. As an example, consider the code in Figure 1 that deter-
mines the maximum of two integers using a non-oblivious if-else
statement. An attacker observing the memory addresses of accessed
program instructions can identify whether 𝑥 > 𝑦, depending on
whether the code within the if-block or the else-block gets executed.
2.3 Data-obliviousness
Oblivious computation is a type of cryptographic computation that
prevents the aforementioned attacks by removing data-dependent
access patterns. Consequently, a data-oblivious enclave program
prevents an attacker from inferring information about the underly-
ing data by observing memory, disk, or network accesses.
In Secure XGBoost, we design and implement data-oblivious
algorithms for model training and inference. In particular, our al-
gorithms produce an identical sequence of disk, network and mem-
ory accesses that depend only on the public information, and are
independent of the input data. Hence, they provably prevent all
side-channels induced by access pattern leakage.
3 Overview
3.1 System model
In this section, we describe the different entities in a Secure XG-
Boost deployment. The entities consist of: (i) multiple data owners
(or clients) who wish to collaboratively train a model on their in-
dividual data; and (ii) an untrusted cloud service that hosts the
Secure XGBoost platform within a cluster of machines. The general
architecture of Secure XGBoost is depicted in Figure 3.
Clients. A client refers to a party who wants to jointly train
a model with other clients. The clients collectively execute the
computation pipeline on the Secure XGBoost platform by remotely
invoking its APIs.
Cloud service with enclaves. The cloud service consists of a
cluster of virtual machines, each with hardware enclave support.
Secure XGBoost distributes the computation across the cluster of
hardware enclaves, which communicate with each other over TLS
channels that begin and end inside the enclaves.
Additionally, an orchestrator service at the cloud mediates com-
munication between clients and the Secure XGBoost platform de-
ployed within enclaves.
3.2 Workflow
The following describes an end-to-end example workflow for using
Secure XGBoost. We use the term ‘command’ to refer to a client’s
desired execution of a step in the computation process, i.e., the APIs
exposed by Secure XGBoost for data loading, training, etc.
(1) The clients agree on a pre-determined sequence of com-
mands that will be executed on Secure XGBoost (§5.1).
(2) Clients attest the enclaves on the cloud (via the remote attes-
tation procedure) to verify that the expected Secure XGBoost
code has been securely loaded within each enclave (§5.2).
(3) Each client𝐶𝑖 encrypts its data with a symmetric key 𝑘𝑖 and
uploads it to cloud storage (§5.3).
(4) The clients submit signed commands to the orchestrator. The
orchestrator aggregates all the client signatures and relays
each command to Secure XGBoost. Secure XGBoost authenti-
cates the signatures, ensuring that every client indeed issued
the same command, and executes the command (§5.4).
(5) Secure XGBoost returns the results of the command (e.g., an
encrypted trained model, or encrypted prediction results)
to the orchestrator, who relays it to the clients. The process
continues until all commands have been executed.
4 Threat model and security guarantees
We describe the aims and capabilities of the attackers that Secure
XGBoost protects against.
4.1 Threat model for the cloud and hardware enclaves
The cloud service provider and the orchestrator service are un-
trusted. The trusted computing base includes the CPU package and
its hardware enclave implementation, as well as our implementation
of Secure XGBoost.
The design of Secure XGBoost is not tied to any specific hard-
ware enclave; instead, Secure XGBoost builds on top of an abstract
model of hardware enclaves where the attacker controls the server’s
software stack outside the enclave (including the OS), but cannot
perform any attacks to glean information from inside the processor
(including processor keys). The attacker can additionally observe
the contents and access patterns of all (encrypted) pages in memory,
for both data and code. We assume that the attacker can observe
the enclave’s memory access patterns at cache line granularity.
Secure XGBoost provides protection against all channels of attack
that exploit data-dependent access patterns at cache-line granularity,
which represent a large class of known attacks on enclaves (e.g.,
[4, 6, 10, 13, 17, 18, 22, 30, 32]). Other attacks that violate our abstract
enclave model—such as attacks based on timing analysis or power
consumption [23, 31], denial-of-service attacks [12, 15], or rollback
attacks [26] (which have complementary solutions [3, 19])—are out
of scope. Transient execution attacks (e.g., [5, 7, 29]) are also out
of scope; these attacks violate the threat model of SGX and are
typically patched promptly by the enclave vendor via microcode
updates.
4.2 Threat model for the clients
Each client expects to protect its data from the cloud service host-
ing the enclaves, as well as the other clients in the collaboration.
Malicious clients may collude with each other and/or the cloud
service to try and learn a victim client’s data. They may also at-
tempt to subvert the integrity of the computation by tampering
with the computation steps (i.e., the commands submitted for exe-
cution). Secure XGBoost protects the client data and computation
in accordance with the threat model and guarantees from §4.1.
5 System Design
5.1 System setup
Secure XGBoost is launched at the cloud service within enclaves. It
contains an embedded list of client names, along with the public
key of a trusted certificate authority (CA), which it uses to verify
a client’s identity before establishing a connection with the client
(described in §5.2). A single “master” enclave generates a 2048-bit
RSA key pair (𝑝𝑘 , 𝑠𝑘) and a nonce 𝑁 . The public key will be used
to establish a secure channel of communication with the clients,
and the nonce to ensure freshness of communicated messages.
Each client 𝐶𝑖 generates a 256-bit symmetric key 𝑘𝑖 . Each client
also has its own 2048-bit RSA key pair (𝑝𝑘𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘𝑖 ), along with a
certificate signed by a certificate authority (CA); the CA’s public key
is embedded in Secure XGBoost. The clients will use the certificate
to authenticate themselves to Secure XGBoost.
5.2 Client-server attestation
Clients authenticate the Secure XGBoost deployment within the
enclave cluster via remote attestation (as described in §2.1). More
precisely, we logically arrange the enclaves in a tree topology;
the enclave at the root of the tree is the “master” enclave. During
attestation, each client attests only the “master” enclave to verify
that the expected Secure XGBoost code has been securely loaded;
in turn, each enclave in the tree (including the master) attests its
children enclaves. As part of the attestation process, the enclaves
establish TLS sessions with their neighboring enclaves. In addition,
the master enclave sends the generated public key 𝑝𝑘 and a nonce
𝑁 to the clients along with the signed attestation report.
Each client encrypts its key 𝑘𝑖 using the enclave’s public key
𝑝𝑘 , and signs the message. It then sends the signed message to
the master enclave along with its certificate. The master enclave
verifies each client’s signed message, decrypts the symmetric key
𝑘𝑖 , and percolates 𝑘𝑖 to all attested enclaves in the cluster, giving
each enclave the ability to decrypt data belonging to the client.
5.3 Data preparation and transfer
Each client uploads its encrypted data to cloud storage; enclaves
retrieve the encrypted data from storage before training. To enable
distributed data processing, each enclave must retrieve only a par-
tition of the encrypted training data. This requirement precludes
each client from encrypting its data as a single blob. Instead, to fa-
cilitate distributed processing of the encrypted data, clients encrypt
each row in their data separately, which enables each enclave to
retrieve, decrypt, and process only a subset of the rows.
Specifically, client 𝐶𝑖 encrypts each row in its data (using its
symmetric key 𝑘𝑖 ) as follows:
𝑗 , 𝑛𝑖 , Enc(row𝑗 ), MAC( 𝑗 | |𝑛𝑖 | |Enc(row𝑗 ))
Here, 𝑗 is the index number of the row being encrypted; 𝑛𝑖 is the
total number of rows in𝐶𝑖 ’s data; Enc(row𝑗 ) is an AES-GCM cipher-
text over the 𝑗-th row; and MAC( 𝑗 | |𝑛𝑖 | |Enc(row𝑗 )) is an AES-GCM
authentication tag computed over the ciphertext, the index num-
ber 𝑗 and the total number of rows 𝑛𝑖 . Including 𝑗 and 𝑛𝑖 within
the authentication tag prevents the untrusted cloud service from
tampering with the data (e.g., by deleting or duplicating rows).
While processing a client’s data, each enclave retrieves a subset
of the encrypted rows. The enclaves then communicate to ensure
that they together loaded 𝑛𝑖 rows, and that all row indices from
𝑗 = 1 . . . 𝑛𝑖 were present in the retrieved data.
5.4 Collaborative API execution
Once all clients have uploaded their data to the cloud, they col-
lectively invoke the APIs exposed by Secure XGBoost. Each API
invocation requires consensus—Secure XGBoost executes an API
call only if it receives the command from every client. This ensures
that no processing can be performed on a particular client’s data
without that client’s consent.
To make an API call, each client submits a signed command to
the orchestrator:
cmd = <seqn, func, params >, Sign(cmd)
A command contains three fields: (i) a sequence number seqn =
(𝑁 | |ctr) that consists of the nonce 𝑁 (obtained from the enclaves
during attestation) concatenated with an incrementing counter;
(ii) the API function func being invoked; and (iii) the function
parameters params. Including the sequence number ensures the
freshness of the command, and prevents replay attacks on the
system. The orchestrator aggregates the signed commands and
relays them to the enclave cluster. Each enclave verifies that an
identical command was submitted by every client before executing
the corresponding function.
Once the function completes, Secure XGBoost produces a signed
response and returns it to the clients via the orchestrator:
resp = <seqn, result >, Sign(resp)
The response contains the sequence number of the request (to
cryptographically bind the response to the request), along with the
results of the function (which are potentially encrypted with the
clients’ keys, depending on the function that was invoked).
6 Data-oblivious training and inference
To prevent side-channel leakage via access patterns, we design data-
oblivious algorithms for training and inference. To implement the
algorithms, we use a small set of data-oblivious primitives, based
on those from prior work [24, 27]. In this section, we first describe
the primitives, and then show their usage in our algorithms.
6.1 Oblivious primitives
Our oblivious primitives operate solely on registers whose con-
tents are loaded from and stored into memory using deterministic
memory accesses. Since registers are private to the processor, any
register-to-register operations cannot be observed by the attacker.
1) Oblivious comparisons (oless, ogreater, oequal). These
primitives can be used to obliviously compare variables, and are
wrappers around the x86 cmp instruction.
2) Oblivious assignment (oassign). The oassign primitive per-
forms conditional assignments, moving a source to a destination
register if a condition is true.
3) Oblivious sort (osort). The osort primitive obliviously sorts
a size 𝑛 array by passing its inputs through a bitonic sorting net-
work [2], which performs an identical sequence of 𝑂 (𝑛 log2 (𝑛))
carefully arranged compare-and-swap operations regardless of the
input array values.
4) Oblivious array access (oaccess). The oaccess primitive ac-
cesses the 𝑖-th element in an array without leaking 𝑖 itself by scan-
ning the array at cache-line granularity while performing oassign
operations, setting the condition to true only at index 𝑖 .
Example. To show how these primitives can be used to implement
higher-level data-oblivious code, Figure 2 depicts the data-oblivious
version of the max program from Figure 1. In this version, all in-
structions are executed sequentially, without any secret-dependent
branches, causing the program to have identical memory access
patterns regardless of the inputs values.
6.2 Oblivious training
Each enclave in the cluster loads a subset of the collected data, and
then uses a distributed algorithm to train the model. In particular,
we use XGBoost’s histogram-based distributed algorithm (hist) for
training an approximate model [8, 14], but redesign the algorithm in
order to make it data-oblivious. In this algorithm, the data samples
always remain distributed across all the enclave machines in the
cluster, and the machines only exchange data summaries with each
other. The summaries are used to construct a single tree globally
and add it to the model’s ensemble.
At a high level, the hist algorithm builds a tree in rounds, adding
a node to the tree per round. Given a data sample 𝑥 ∈ R𝑑 , at each
node the algorithm chooses a feature 𝑗 and a threshold 𝑡 according
to which the data samples are partitioned (i.e., if 𝑥 ( 𝑗) < 𝑡 , the
sample is partitioned into the left subtree, otherwise the right). To
add a node to the tree, each enclave in the cluster builds a histogram
over its data for each feature; the boundaries of the bins in the
histogram serve as potential splitting points for the corresponding
feature. The algorithm combines the histograms across enclaves,
and uses the aggregate statistics to find the best feature and splitting
point. Note that in the absence of data-obliviousness the algorithm
reveals a large amount of information via access-pattern leakage:
e.g., it leaks which feature was chosen at each node in the tree, as
well the complete ordering of the data samples. We now describe
the oblivious algorithm in more detail.
Oblivious histogram initialization. Before a tree can be con-
structed, all the enclaves in the cluster first align on the boundaries
of the histograms per feature. These boundaries are computed once
and re-used for adding all the nodes in the tree, instead of comput-
ing new histogram boundaries per node.
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Figure 4: Illustration of oblivious training in Secure XG-
Boost. Numbers indicate the order in which nodes are added.
Non-oblivious training adds nodes sequentially to the tree,
while our algorithm constructs a full binary tree while
adding nodes level-wise.
(1) Each enclave first obliviously creates a summary 𝑆 of its data
(one summary per feature): each element in the summary
is a tuple (𝑦,𝑤), where 𝑦 𝑗 are the unique feature values in
the list of data samples, and𝑤 𝑗 are the sum of the weights
of the corresponding samples. To create the summary, the
enclave sorts its samples using osort. Then, it initializes
an empty array 𝑆 of size equal to the number of samples.
Next, it scans the samples to identify unique values while
maintaining a running aggregate of the weights: for each
sample {𝑥𝑖 } it updates 𝑆 [𝑖] using oselect, either setting it
to 0 (if 𝑥𝑖−1 = 𝑥𝑖 ), or to the aggregated weight. At the end, it
sorts 𝑆 using osort to push all 0 values to the end of the list.
(2) Each enclave then obliviously prunes its summary to a size
𝑏 + 1 (where 𝑏 is a user-defined parameter for the maximum
number of bins in the histogram). The aim of the pruning
operation is to select 𝑏 + 1 elements from the list with ranks
0, |𝑆 |𝑏 ,
2 |𝑆 |
𝑏 . . . |𝑆 |, where |𝑆 | is the size of the summary. We
do this obliviously as follows. First, the enclave sorts the
summary using osort. Next, it scans the sorted summary,
and for each element in the summary, it selects the element
(using oassign) if its rank matches the next rank to be se-
lected, otherwise it selects a dummy. Finally, it sorts the
selected elements (which includes dummies), pushing the
dummy elements to the end, and truncates the list.
(3) Next, each enclave broadcasts its summary 𝑆 . The summaries
are pairwise combined into a “global” summary (one sum-
mary per feature) as follows: (i) Each pair of summaries is
first merged into a single list using osort. The tuples in the
merged summary are then scanned to identify adjacent val-
ues that are duplicates; the duplicates are zeroed out using
oaccess while aggregating the weights. The merged sum-
mary is then sorted using osort to push all 0 values to the
end of the list, and then truncated. (ii) Next, the merged
summary is pruned as before into a summary of size 𝑏.
The global summary per feature computed in this manner repre-
sents the bins of a histogram, with the constituent values in the
summary as the boundaries of different bins.
Oblivious node addition. The algorithm uses the feature his-
tograms to construct a tree, adding nodes to the tree starting with
the root. As nodes get added to the tree, the data gets partitioned
at each node across its children. Here, we describe an oblivious
subroutine for obliviously adding a node by finding the optimal
split for the node, using the data samples that belong to the node.
(1) Each enclave computes a histogram for each feature by scan-
ning its data samples to compute a gradient per sample,
followed by updating a single bin in each histogram using
oaccess combined with oassign. The enclaves then broad-
cast their histograms.
(2) The enclaves collectively sum up the histograms. Each en-
clave then computes a score function over the aggregated
histogram, deterministically identifying the best feature to
split by, as well as the split value.
(3) Finally, each enclave partitions its data based on the split
value: it simply updates a marker per sample (using oassign)
that identifies which child node the sample belongs to.
Level-wise oblivious tree construction. A simple way to con-
struct a tree is to sequentially add nodes to the tree as described
above, until the entire tree is constructed. To prevent leaking infor-
mation about the data or the tree: (i) the order in which nodes are
added needs to be independent of the data; and (ii) a fixed number of
nodes need to be added to the tree. At the same time, adding nodes
sequentially by repeatedly invoking the node addition subroutine
above is sub-optimal for performance. This is because oblivious
node addition only uses the data that belongs to the node; however,
concealing which data samples belong to the node either requires
accessing each sample using oaccess, or scanning all the samples
while performing dummy operations for those that do not belong
to the node. Both these options impact performance adversely.
We simultaneously solve all the problems above by sequentially
adding entire levels to the tree, instead of individual nodes. That
is, we obliviously add all the nodes at a particular level of a tree
in a single scan of all the data samples, as follows. For each data
sample, we first use oaccess to obliviously fetch the histograms of
the node that the sample belongs to. We then update the histograms
as described in the subroutine above, and then obliviously write
back the histogram to the node using oaccess.
Note that as a result of level-wise tree construction, we always
build a full binary tree (unlike the non-oblivious algorithm) and
some nodes in the tree are “dummy” nodes. These nodes are ignored
during inference. Figure 4 illustrates how nodes are added to the
tree during our oblivious training routine.
6.3 Oblivious inference
Inference normally occurs by traversing a tree from root to leaf and
comparing the feature value of each interior node with the corre-
sponding feature in the test data instance. To obliviously evaluate
an XGBoost model on a data instance, we follow [24]. In summary,
we store each layer in the tree as an array, use the oaccess primi-
tive to obliviously select the proper node at that layer, and use the
oless primitive for comparison.
7 Implementation
In this section we describe our implementation of Secure XGBoost
and discuss a few use cases in industry.
7.1 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of Secure XGBoost based on XG-
Boost version 0.9. Following XGBoost’s implementation model, we
import securexgboost as xgb
# Initialize client and connect to enclave cluster
xgb.init_client(user_name ="user1",
sym_key_file ="key.txt",
priv_key_file ="user1.pem",
cert_file ="user1.crt")
# Client side remote attestation to authenticate enclaves
xgb.attest ()
# Load the encrypted data and associate it with a user
dtrain = xgb.DMatrix ({" user1": "train.enc"})
dtest = xgb.DMatrix ({" user1": "test.enc"})
params = {
"objective ": "binary:logistic",
"gamma": "0.1",
"max_depth ": "3"
}
# Train a model
num_rounds = 5
booster = xgb.train(params , dtrain , num_rounds)
# Get encrypted predictions and decrypt them
predictions , num_preds = booster.predict(dtest)
Figure 5: Example client code in Secure XGBoost. Functions
highlighted in red are additions to the existing XGBoost li-
brary. Functions highlighted in blue exist in XGBoost but
were modified for Secure XGBoost.
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Figure 6: Evaluation comparison among the insecure base-
line, and encrypted as well as oblivious Secure XGBoost
provide a Python API on top of a core C++ library, imitating the XG-
Boost API as much as possible. An example of the Secure XGBoost
API is shown in Figure 5. We used the Open Enclave SDK [25] to
interface between the untrusted host and the enclave and to enable
Secure XGBoost to run agnostic of a specific hardware enclave;
Mbed TLS [20] for cryptography and for secure communication
between enclaves; and gRPC [11] for client-server communication.
Our codebase is open source and available at https://github.com/
mc2-project/secure-xgboost.
7.2 Adoption
We’ve been fortunate enough to work with several collaborators in
industry, each of whom has been using our system for a different
purpose. Ericsson used Secure XGBoost to bring together mutually
distrustful network operators to collaborate in applications such
as predicting cell tower hardware faults [28]. Scotiabank has been
leading an effort with other Canadian banks to use Secure XGBoost
to fight money laundering. Finally, Ant Financial is using Secure
XGBoost in production for credit loan risk modeling.
8 Evaluation results
We ran experiments on Secure XGBoost using a synthetic dataset
obtained from Ant Financial, consisting of 100, 000 data samples
with 126 features. Our experiments compare three systems: vanilla
XGBoost; encrypted Secure XGBoost (a version of Secure XGBoost
without obliviousness); and oblivious Secure XGBoost (Secure XG-
Boost with obliviousness enabled). We ran our experiments on Mi-
crosoft’s Azure Confidential Computing service. We used DC4s_V2
machines, which have support for Intel SGX enclaves, and are
equipped with 4 vCPUs, 16 GiB of memory, and a 112 MiB enclave
page cache.
Figure 6 shows our training results. In general, encrypted Se-
cure XGBoost incurs 4.5 × −5.1× overhead compared to vanilla
XGBoost, which provides no security. Oblivious Secure XGBoost
incurs 16.7 × −178.2× overhead over encrypted Secure XGBoost.
The main takeaway is that one has to be careful in tuning the
hyperparameters by adjusting the number of bins, the number of
levels per tree and the number of trees. For example, decreasing the
number of bins while increasing the number of trees could improve
performance while maintaining the same accuracy.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed Secure XGBoost, an oblivious distributed
solution for gradient boosted decision trees using hardware en-
claves. Our codebase is available at https://github.com/mc2-project/
secure-xgboost, and we are currently working with industry col-
laborators to deploy our system.
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